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Poverty is associated with a wide range of counterproductive economic behaviors. Scarcity 
theory proposes that poverty itself induces a scarcity mindset, which subsequently forces the 
poor into suboptimal decisions and behaviors. The purpose of our work is to provide an 
integrated, up-to-date, critical review of this theory. To this end, we reviewed the empirical 
evidence for three fundamental propositions: (1) Poverty leads to attentional focus and neglect 
causing overborrowing, (2) poverty induces trade-off thinking resulting in more consistent 
consumption decisions, and (3) poverty reduces mental bandwidth and subsequently increases 
time discounting and risk aversion. Our findings indicate that the current literature 
predominantly confirms the first and second proposition, although methodological issues 
prevent a final conclusion. Evidence for the third proposition was not conclusive. Additionally, 
we evaluated the overall status of scarcity theory. Although the theory provides an original, 
coherent, and parsimonious explanation for the relationship between financial scarcity and 
economic decision making, the theory does not fully accord with the data and lacks some 
precision. We conclude that both theoretical and empirical work are needed to build a stronger 
theory.   
 
 





Poverty is associated with seemingly irrational and counterproductive behaviors in several areas 
of economic life, both in developed and developing countries. Low-income households tend to 
save too little (Shurtleff 2009), to borrow repeatedly at high-interest rates (Banerjee and Duflo 
2007; Skiba and Tobacman 2008), and to spend relatively large parts of money on tobacco, 
alcohol, and lotteries (Banerjee and Duflo 2007; Blalock et al. 2007; Haisley et al. 2008; World 
Health Organization 2011). Additionally, low-income individuals are more likely to cut back 
their non-emergency healthcare services (Lusardi et al. 2010) and while they are eligible to 
welfare programs, take-up rates are low (Bertrand et al. 2006; Hernanz et al. 2004). The debate 
about these behaviors of the poor reflects several views. One view suggests that these behaviors 
mirror the poor's preferences and should be seen as rational adaptations to their economic 
circumstances. The culture-of-poverty view proposes that the poor’s norms, values, and 
attitudes deviate from others and shape their preferences and behaviors (Lewis 1998). The 
human capital view suggests that these behaviors reflect a lack of human capital due to a lack 
of education, work experience, and financial literacy (see e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell 2014). 
A few years ago, Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) published their influential book, 
Scarcity, presenting a new theory about these behaviors.1, 2 Scarcity theory integrates insights 
from cognitive psychology and economics and attempts to explain a wide range of behaviors 
of the poor. The poor have to make their decisions under severe financial conditions that change 
the way they feel and think. Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) propose that poverty itself induces 
a scarcity mindset, which subsequently affects the poor's decisions and behaviors. The poor 
 
1 Scarcity theory is part of the behavioral economic view proposing that the behaviors of the poor reflect a 
psychology of poverty. Living in poverty creates specific psychological outcomes (e.g., stress, negative affect, 
mental bandwidth tax) that subsequently impair economic decision making (see e.g., Haushofer and Fehr 2014; 
Schilbach et al. 2016).  
2 The book received positive reviews from Nobel Prize winners Daniel Kahneman and Richard Thaler, several 
other leading behavioral economic experts, and popular media. According to The Economist, "the book's unified 
theory of the scarcity mentality is novel in its scope and ambition" (The Economist 2013). 
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face tight budgets and income volatility, which requires them to juggle with current and 
upcoming expenditures. These urgent demands consume elementary cognitive resources, such 
as attention, executive control, and working memory, leaving fewer resources for non-pressing 
demands. As a consequence, financial scarcity forces the poor into counterproductive behaviors 
that may perpetuate the condition of poverty.  
Scarcity theory is widely seen as a unified, attractive, and promising view on poverty 
and economic decision making.3 This theory played a prominent role in the World Development 
Report 2015 (World Bank 2015). Furthermore, this theory has opened a new direction for 
scientific research. Scientists from different disciplines have begun to test specific elements of 
scarcity theory in lab studies and real-world settings (e.g., Carvalho et al. 2016; Fehr et al. 2019; 
Huijsmans et al. 2019; Lichand and Mani 2020; Ong et al. 2019; Plantinga et al. 2018; Shah et 
al. 2015). Other studies integrated elements of the theory into broader frameworks explaining 
consumption behavior and economic decision making under financial constraints (Adamkovič 
and Martončik 2017; Cannon et al. 2019; Hamilton, Mittal, et al. 2019; Hamilton, Thompson, 
et al. 2019). 
The purpose of our work is to provide an integrated review of scarcity theory applied to 
the context of poverty. To this end, we focus on reviewing the evidence for three fundamental 
propositions of this theory. First, poverty leads to attentional focus on scarcity-related demands 
and neglect of other issues, causing overborrowing. Second, poverty induces trade-off thinking, 
i.e. weighing a particular expense against other possible expenses, resulting in more consistent 
consumption decisions. Third, poverty reduces mental bandwidth (cognitive capacity and 
cognitive control), increasing time discounting and risk aversion. For each of these 
propositions, we discuss its foundation and review initial and new studies, including 
 
3 Mullainathan and Shafir did not provide a single umbrella term for the theory discussed in their book. Others 
refer to the theory as "psychological responses to scarcity" (Zhao and Tomm 2018) or "resource scarcity" 




replications, non-findings, and criticisms. Additionally, we discuss the implications for the 
validity and generalizability of the proposition, identify gaps in knowledge, and propose 
pathways for future research. Finally, we integrate our findings into an overall evaluation of the 
status of scarcity theory. 
Our study results in four main findings. First, lab studies provide consistent evidence of 
scarcity drawing one's attentional focus to scarcity-related demands and causing 
overborrowing. However, the literature lacks field studies investigating whether these 
mechanisms hold in real-world contexts. Second, most studies confirm that poverty induces 
trade-off thinking and subsequently results in more consistent consumption decisions, but 
important methodological issues prevent a firm conclusion. Third, the literature provides mixed 
evidence of poverty impairing cognitive capacity and cognitive control, and only weak evidence 
of poverty increasing time discounting and risk aversion via this mechanism. Fourth, although 
scarcity theory does provide an original, coherent, and parsimonious explanation that financial 
scarcity affects economic decision making, the theory does not fully accord with the data. We 
conclude that both theoretical and empirical work is needed to address this issue. 
Our work contributes to the current literature by providing an up-to-date and integrative 
overview of the literature and by critically reviewing the evidence of scarcity theory applied to 
poverty and economic decision making. Previous literature studies have concentrated on 
providing an overview of the key ideas of scarcity theory and evidence supporting this theory 
(Shah et al. 2015; Zhao and Tomm 2018). Others discussed evidence for specific relationships 
of the theory as part of a broader literature review (Adamkovič and Martončik 2017; Cannon et 
al. 2019; E. B. Dean et al. 2019; Hamilton, Mittal, et al. 2019; Hamilton, Thompson, et al. 2019; 
Kremer et al. 2019; Sheehy-Skeffington and Rea 2017). While the field is fast-growing, the 
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literature lacks an up-to-date, integrative, and critical review of (the evidence for) all key 
aspects of scarcity theory.4 Our work aims at filling this gap. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the main concepts of scarcity 
theory and methods used in empirical studies. Sections 3–5 review the literature concerning the 
three key propositions of scarcity theory mentioned above. In Section 6, we discuss our 
integrated findings and general directions for future research.  
 
2. Scarcity theory: An overview 
Scarcity theory explains several behaviors and decisions of people who face scarcity in a 
particular area of life. Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) define scarcity as "having less than you 
feel you need" (p. 4).5 Scarcity can be experienced in several contexts, e.g., when people are 
dieting, when being thirsty, by facing deadlines, in the case of loneliness, and when facing 
poverty (Cannon et al. 2019). The theory builds on cognitive psychological research regarding 
several features of human cognition that affect (economic) decision making. The key idea of 
scarcity theory is that scarcity itself induces a specific mindset by affecting how people think 
and decide, and subsequently affect human behaviors. Poverty is the key domain to which 
scarcity theory has been applied (Zhao and Tomm 2018).  
Figure 1 reflects the theoretical framework of scarcity theory applied to poverty and 
economic decision making.6 In this framework, poverty affects economic decisions and 
behaviors via three routes stemming from two core psychological mechanisms (tunneling and 
cognitive load).7 First, poverty causes an attentional focus that enhances resource efficiency 
 
4 Almost half of the reviewed studies appeared in 2019 or 2020. Most of these studies were not included in previous 
reviews.  
5 This definition highlights the subjective nature of scarcity. Others define (resource) scarcity as "the condition of 
having insufficient resources to cope with demands" (Zhao and Tomm 2018, p. 2) or "a discrepancy between one’s 
current level of resources and a higher, more desirable reference point" (Cannon et al. 2019, p. 105). 
6 We derived this framework from Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) and the literature overview of Shah (2015). 
7 In our review, we focus on the routes proposed by Mullainathan and Shafir (2013).  
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and facilitates memory-encoding, and an attentional neglect that leads to forgetful, neglectful, 
and overborrowing behaviors (arrows 1 and 2). This process of attentional focus and neglect is 
also referred to as tunneling. Second, poverty-induced focus causes trade-off thinking (3) which 
creates a more stable frame of value and consistent consumption decisions (4). Third, poverty 
reduces mental bandwidth (cognitive capacity and executive control) (5) and subsequently 
increases temporal discounting and risk aversion (6). Scarcity theory assumes that cognitive 
load underlies the negative effect of poverty on cognitive capacity and executive control. 
Figure 1: Theoretical framework reflecting scarcity theory applied to poverty and economic 
decision making 
 
As reflected in Figure 1, scarcity theory contains a poverty cycle in which poverty itself 
causes poverty-reinforcing behaviors via specific psychological mechanisms (routes 1–2–7 and 
5–6–7). Increased temporal discounting and overborrowing may ultimately reduce the overall 
payoff of the poor. Similarly, increased risk aversion can discourage long-term investments 
(e.g., in education or health) that would result in larger future payoffs. Subsequently, these 
behaviors reinforce the condition of poverty. As a consequence, it becomes more difficult to 
escape the situation of poverty. Otherwise, the trade-off thinking route may positively affect 
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the economic condition of the poor (route 1–3–4–7). We will discuss each of these three routes 
in more detail in Sections 3–5. 
Studies testing the hypotheses of scarcity theory reflect three types of study designs. 
First, laboratory experiments often exogenously induce scarcity by varying levels of resources 
(e.g., time, attempts, budgets) to be used in a task or game (see e.g., Shah et al. 2012, 2019; 
Spiller 2011; Zhao and Tomm 2017). Because the researcher has full control over the 
environment, this method helps to detect the causality of relationships and to gain insights into 
its underlying mechanisms. Second, cross-sectional and quasi-experimental studies investigate 
the consequences of poverty outside the lab. Cross-sectional difference studies typically 
investigate whether low- and high-income participants do react differently to a particular cue 
or a specific scenario (see e.g., Shah et al. 2015, 2018). Quasi-experimental studies typically 
investigate how variation in income interacts with other factors to reshape cognition and 
behaviors (see e.g., Mani et al. 2013; Plantinga et al. 2018; Shah et al. 2015, 2018). Although 
these studies build on an ecologically valid approach, they face difficulties in establishing 
causality. Third, scientists use natural and field experiments to establish causality in a real-
world environment. These studies typically test how fluctuations in income, wealth, or 
perceived financial situation affect outcomes (see e.g., Carvalho et al. 2016; Mani et al. 2013; 
Ong et al. 2019). Each of these methods has its pros and cons, reason why it is important to 
provide a review of the integrative evidence of empirical studies. 
We observe a mismatch between the poverty definition of scarcity theory and the 
instruments used in empirical studies to measure this concept. Building on the general scarcity 
definition ("having less than you feel you need"), scarcity theory defines poverty as "the gap 
between one's needs and the resources available to fulfill them" (Mani et al. 2013a, p. 976). 
Hagenaars and De Vos (1988) distinguish three types of poverty definitions. First, objective 
absolute poverty defines poverty as having less than a defined minimum income. Second, the 
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objective relative poverty definition classifies people to be poor when having a relatively low 
income or when lacking certain commodities that are common in society. Third, subjective 
poverty refers to feelings or perceptions of having not enough to get along (see also Van Praag 
and Frijters 1999). Following this categorization of poverty definitions, scarcity theory builds 
on the subjective poverty definition, which concentrates on having not enough financial means 
to fulfill one’s felt needs. Remarkably, almost all cross-sectional and quasi-experimental studies 
use income as a measurement instrument of poverty consistent with the objective relative 
poverty definition.8 This mismatch is remarkable because Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) 
already concluded that income is "at best a crude proxy for scarcity" (p. 72). Not all low-income 
individuals experience feelings of having less than they need. Furthermore, "some of those 
whom we classified as well off might well have been experiencing scarcity – for example, some 
were surely burdened by mortgage payments, credit card debt, college loans, or large families" 
(Mullainathan and Shafir 2013, p. 72). According to scarcity theory, the extent to which one 
feels that one has enough to fulfill one's needs defines subjective poverty, not the level of 
income.9   
This mismatch between the poverty definition and chosen measurement instruments can 
be problematic. Using a measurement instrument that only roughly measures financial scarcity  
may prevent detecting the effects of financial scarcity on hypothesized outcomes. We 
recommend future empirical studies to use measurement instruments aligning the subjective 
poverty definition. To facilitate this alignment, an inventory of both existing measures and 
development of new instruments is needed.10 The next three sections discuss the evidence for 
the propositions of our framework. 
 
8 This claim is based on our literature review. As Table A1–A3 shows, nearly all cross-sectional and quasi-
experimental studies use income as measure of poverty. This claim does not carry over to other study designs (lab 
and natural experiments). 
9 Of course, factors such as having a relatively low income compared to others or lacking commodities that are 
common in society will at least partly explain subjective poverty. 
10 See Hagenaars and De Vos (1988) for some existing subjective poverty measures that might be useful. 
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3. Poverty, attention, and borrowing behavior 
Attention refers to "the flexible allocation of cognitive resources toward stimuli, internal 
representations, and outputs that are currently most important for the accomplishment of a 
behavioral goal" (Dosenbach and Petersen 2009, p. 655). Attention allocation is a central and 
unifying theme in behavioral economics (Gabaix 2019). Inattention may explain a broad range 
of behavioral phenomena ranging from inattention to prices to hyperbolic discounting. 
Mullainathan & Shafir (2013) hypothesize that feelings of scarcity influence the way attentional 
resources are allocated and subsequently affect economic decisions and behavior. This 
mechanism consists of two parts when applied to poverty: Poverty causes (1) an attentional 
focus on poverty-related issues that enhances resource efficiency and facilitates memory 
encouding, and (2) an attentional neglect that results in neglectful, forgetful, and overborrowing 
behaviors. The process of attentional focus and neglect is also referred to as tunneling 
(Mullainathan and Shafir 2013). Table A1 (see Appendix) provides an overview of studies 
testing these propositions. We will discuss these findings in more detail below.  
 
3.1 Poverty leads to a greater focus 
Several studies have shown that feelings of scarcity induce a focus on scarcity-related demands 
(see Zhao and Tomm 2018 for an overview). Two lab experiments showed this mechanism 
using manipulations of physiological scarcity. One experiment used manipulations of drink 
scarcity. Participants who were made feeling thirsty scored better on a recall task concerning 
drinking-related items compared to non-thirsty participants, while this was not the case for non-
drinking-related items (Aarts et al. 2001). The same held in an experiment where participants 
were assigned to either longer or shorter periods of food deprivation. Fasting participants 
showed higher recall of food-related words, but not non-food-related words, compared to non-
fasting participants (Radel and Clement-Guillotin 2012). Similarly, students with higher levels 
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of financial anxiety paid relatively high attention to money-related cues (Shapiro and Burchell 
2012). These results suggest that feelings of scarcity allocate attentional resources toward 
scarcity-related needs.  
Shah et al. (2012) examined whether attention focusing also holds for poverty-related 
scarcity. Their study consisted of several lab experiments where participants played budget-
based games. To manipulate scarcity, participants were randomly allocated to small budgets 
(poor) or large budgets (rich). In one experiment, participants played the Angry Blueberries 
game. Participants had to fire blueberries with a slingshot to hit waffles. They earned points for 
each waffle that they hit. To manipulate levels of scarcity, participants were allocated to either 
small (3 per round) or large (15 per round) numbers of available shots. The poor (small number 
of shots) invested on average more time for aiming the first shot in each level of the game, 
suggesting that they focused and expended greater effort into the task at hand compared to more 
affluent participants (larger number of shots).11 Shah et al. (2019) replicated this finding using 
a larger sample underpinning the robustness of this result. A study of Zhao and Tomm (2017) 
provides additional evidence for the hypothesis by tracking visual attention. In one experiment, 
participants were randomly assigned to either a small ($20) or a larger ($100) price budget and 
were asked to place an order from a hypothetical restaurant menu. Using an eye-tracking 
technique to measure visual attention, they found that participants under scarcity spent 
significantly more time focusing on scarcity-related information (e.g., prices) than participants 
under abundance. Overall, these findings show that feelings of scarcity serve to allocate one's 
attention to scarcity-related issues, irrespective of the scarcity domain.12  
 
11 Additionally, Shah et al. (2012) conducted a lab experiment where participants were allocated either small or 
large accounts of guesses in a word puzzle game. The authors proposed that small-budget participants would 
engage more deeply in the game which might cause cognitive exhaustion. Indeed, this initial study shows that poor 
participants performed worse compared to richer participants on a cognitive control task. However, this result was 
not replicated in studies containing much larger samples (Camerer et al. 2018; Shah et al. 2019). 
12 A study of Sharma and Alter (2012) suggests that financial scarcity elicits a greater focus on scarce cues more 
generally. Participants were asked to recall a situation in which they were financially worse (better) off than their 




This mechanism can be translated into the real-world environment of poverty (Shah 
2015; Shah et al. 2012). When having access to enough financial resources, basic expenditures 
such as groceries, rent payments, and utility bills do not require much attention and effort to 
manage. However, under financial scarcity these expenses might become urgent, pressing, and 
difficult to handle because one's financial resources are not enough to fulfill all needs. As a 
consequence, these activities capture one's attention, resulting in a greater focus to solve these 
issues. A recent study suggests that the poor mentally associate everyday experiences and 
activities with money. Shah et al. (2018) showed that lower-income people are more likely to 
think about the costs of everyday activities than higher-income people. Furthermore, these 
thoughts arise spontaneously (e.g., when thinking about visiting a doctor) and are hard to 
suppress. Overall, these results suggest that the poor are more focused on the economic 
dimension of activities, thus providing a fuller picture of the subjective experience of being 
poor. 
Scarcity-induced focus seems to come with some benefits. First, it might enhance 
resource or performance efficiency, also referred to as "focus dividend" (Mullainathan and 
Shafir 2013). In the Angry Blueberries study, participants with smaller budgets earned on 
average more points per shot and were thus more efficient than participants with larger budgets. 
Second, scarcity-induced focus might facilitate memory-encoding of task-relevant information. 
In the restaurant menu study, Zhao and Tomm (2017) found that participants with a smaller 
budget were significantly better at recalling scarcity-related information (e.g., prices) afterward 
than participants with larger budgets.13 This finding might explain why low-income people are 
more likely to know the starting price of a taxi than high-income individuals, despite the fact 
that they take taxis less frequently (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013).  
 
abundant stimuli and goods. These results suggest that financial scarcity leads to paying more attention to what is 
scarce in the environment.  
13 This finding also generalized to another scarcity domain (calorie scarcity). 
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Lichand and Mani (2020) investigated the effect of scarcity on attention allocation 
outside the lab. In a field study among Brazilian farmers who regularly face periods of droughts, 
the authors investigated the differential effects of income uncertainty and income level on 
tunneling. To examine the impact of income uncertainty, they exploited exogenous variation in 
daily rainfall. They found that participants exposed to less rainfall were more likely to tunnel 
(i.e., scarcity-related demands captured their attentional resources) than participants facing 
more rainfall. Additionally, they incorporated a lab-in-the-field experiment in which randomly 
half of the participants were induced with drought-related worries. Similar to the field study, 
they found that induced scarcity-related worries led to tunneling. Furthermore, in the same 
experimental setting, they investigated the impact of income level on tunneling using variation 
in payday of a conditional cash transfer program.14 They found that participants were more 
likely to tunnel in the period before payday than after payday. More specifically, the effect sizes 
were larger closer to payday. Overall, the authors conclude that both a low level of income and 
greater uncertainty in income induces tunneling.  
We provide two methodological notes to these findings. First, variation in payday seems 
not to reflect variation in income levels (as proposed by the authors), because the amount of the 
cash transfer did not differ between experimental groups. We suggest that variation in payday 
rather reflects variation in liquidity constraints as households are more likely to face liquidity 
problems before than after payday. Second, the tunneling measure showed some 
inconsistencies. Tunneling was not directly observed, but derived from performance on a 
number of tasks. Although the overall effect of variation in rainfall on the tunneling index was 
significant, the effects on individual measures differed and for some measures even pointed in 
the opposite direction. This questions the validity of the tunneling measures. Furthermore, the 
 
14 More specifically, the authors exploited variation in the timing of monthly Bolsa Família payments. 
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effects of variation in rainfall on the individual tunneling measures were quite different from 
that of induced drought-related thoughts, suggesting that different mechanisms are at play.  
 
3.2 Poverty leads to neglect of other useful information 
Scarcity theory hypothesizes that a greater focus on pressing needs comes at a cost: Scarcity-
induced focus leads to neglect of other useful information. Studies so far have not provided 
clear evidence for this proposition. Shah et al. (2012) examined this hypothesis using an 
experiment called “Family Feud.” In this game, participants earned points for guessing popular 
answers to survey questions. Participants were allocated either small or large time budgets. 
Furthermore, some participants got a preview of questions of future rounds, others not. While 
the rich performed better with than without previews, no differences were found for poorer 
participants. This finding suggests that poorer participants did not pay enough attention to future 
issues, possibly because they focused more on the current question. However, in their high-
powered replication study, Shah et al. (2019) found that richer participants performed only 
slightly better with than without previews. Furthermore, they did not find significant differences 
between poor and rich participants. Overall, these studies provide only very weak evidence for 
the hypothesis that scarcity-induced focus leads to attentional neglect of future events. We note 
that these studies have only tested this hypothesis indirectly because (visual) attention of the 
participants was not directly observed.  
To solve this issue, Zhao and Tomm (2017) used eye-tracking to measure visual 
attention in their restaurant menu experiment, as discussed above. Participants under scarcity 
not only spent more time on scarcity-related information (e.g., prices) but also less time on other 
useful information (e.g., calorie information) than participants under abundance. Importantly, 
they were also more likely to neglect beneficial information (e.g., a discount placed at the 
bottom of the menu card) that would have alleviated the condition of scarcity. These findings 
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suggest that scarcity not only leads to a greater focus on scarcity-related information but also 
results in attentional neglect of other useful information. Additional experiments of Zhao and 
Tomm (2017) provide a richer picture of how scarcity induces neglect of useful information 
apart from the narrow focus on scarce resources. They showed that people under time scarcity 
were less likely to detect time-saving cues and more likely to forget previous instructions than 
people under abundance. These results suggest that scarcity impairs both information detection 
and prospective memory.  
 
3.3 Poverty leads to overborrowing 
Scarcity theory predicts that poverty leads to overborrowing via attentional focus and neglect. 
Shah et al. (2012) examined this hypothesis using two lab experiments. In the first experiment, 
participants played a follow-up of the Angry Blueberries game. Participants were not only 
randomly assigned to small or large budgets of shots but also to some borrowing options (no 
borrowing, borrowing shots with or without paying interest). Importantly, borrowing was a 
choice, so participants could neglect this opportunity. Results showed that the poor borrowed a 
higher proportion of their budget than the rich and gradually increased borrowing when their 
time budget shrunk. Furthermore, participants performed best when not having the opportunity 
to borrow, worse when they could borrow without interest, and worst when they could borrow 
against interest. Thus, borrowing under scarcity was counterproductive, especially when it was 
expensive. Meanwhile, the rich performed similarly under these conditions. In the second 
experiment, they examined the same mechanism using a follow-up of the Family Feud game. 
In this version, some of both the time-rich and time-poor participants could borrow time from 
future rounds while others could not. Again, they found that scarcity itself led people to 
overborrow and enter into cycles of debt, while this behavior did not happen under abundance. 
Importantly, these results were replicated in their high-powered study (Shah et al. 2019), 
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although the effect sizes were smaller than in the initial study. Overall, these studies provide 
consistent evidence from the lab that scarcity leads to overborrowing.  
These decision-making patterns seem to reflect the choices of people living in the 
context of financial scarcity. Attention is allocated to the most pressing financial problems and 
needs. Future needs loom far away. From this point of view, borrowing, even at high-interest 
rates, appears to be a proper solution to meet the pressing needs. However, the Angry 
Blueberries experiments show that borrowing might be counterproductive in the long run. It 
suggests that people may pay too little attention to the future implications of borrowing as a 
result of facing financial scarcity. This may explain why the poor rely on payday loans even 
when annualized costs of these loans exceed 7,000 percent (Skiba and Tobacman 2008). 
However, the mechanism underlying the effect of scarcity on borrowing behavior 
remains unclear. Scarcity theory proposes that this effect is the result of attentional focus and 
neglect. The initial Angry Blueberries study of Shah et al. (2012) provides some correlational 
evidence that attentional focus predicts borrowing behavior. They found that for budget-poor 
participants, spending more time on aiming a shot was associated with subsequently borrowing 
more shots. However, this result was not replicated in their larger-sample study (Shah et al. 
2019). Although the Angry Blueberries studies showed that scarcity leads to a greater focus on 
scarcity-related issues, it remains unclear whether this mechanism also explains the borrowing 
behavior of the poor participants. Future lab studies should examine the exact mechanism 
underlying the effect of scarcity on overborrowing. Furthermore, the literature contains only 
lab studies providing evidence for the effect of scarcity on overborrowing. Field studies are 
needed that investigate the impact of scarcity on borrowing behavior in real-world settings. 
In summary, lab studies provide consistent evidence that scarcity leads to a greater focus 
and causes overborrowing. Evidence that scarcity leads to attentional neglect is weaker. We 
recommend future lab studies to test this proposition further and to find out under what 
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circumstances this proposition holds. Importantly, a large gap exists between scarcity 
inductions in lab experiments (e.g., manipulating budgets in the Angry Blueberries game) and 
facing financial scarcity in real life. The gap might limit the extrapolation of findings of lab 
experiments to real-world poverty. Specifically, these lab experiments differ from real life in 
duration (short vs. longer), frequency (once vs frequently), and severity (facing scarcity in a 
game vs. real life) of experiencing scarcity. To solve this problem, we recommend designing 
lab settings that better reflect facing scarcity in the daily lives of the poor. Furthermore, lab 
studies are needed to identify the exact mechanism underlying the effect of scarcity on 
overborrowing. So far, studies investigating the attentional mechanism outside the lab are 
scarce. Studies in real-world contexts are needed to examine the ecological validity of this 
mechanism. As discussed above, the field study of Lichand and Mani (2020) provides some 
evidence for differential effects of income level and income uncertainty on attention allocation, 
although the study comes with some methodological issues. More studies are needed to clarify 
whether the attentional mechanism holds in the real world and underlies the impact of poverty 
on borrowing decisions.   
 
4. Poverty, trade-off thinking, and consumption decisions 
Standard microeconomic theories build on the rationale that all people face scarcity and 
consequently have to make trade-offs between consumption options as no individual has access 
to unlimited financial resources. Thus, buying a particular product comes with opportunity 
costs, meaning that, by spending on one good, one forgoes another consumption good. 
However, behavioral research has shown that people often neglect these opportunity costs when 
making consumption decisions in real life (Frederick et al. 2009). Scarcity theory hypothesizes 
that poverty induces trade-off thinking, which creates a more stable frame of value and makes 
the poor less prone to some inconsistencies in making consumption decisions. As a 
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consequence, the poor's decision-making processes align better with microeconomic 
assumptions resulting in more consistent choices and higher utility within a given budget. Next, 
we discuss the evidence for each of these predictions (see Table A2 for an overview).   
Some empirical investigations support the hypothesis that poverty induces trade-off 
thinking. Compared to higher-income people, lower-income individuals report more trade-off 
thinking in case of hypothetical purchases (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013) and deciding about 
their willingness to pay for a product (Shah et al. 2015). The proposed underlying mechanism 
is that the poor naturally think about trade-offs because they face tight budgets (Mullainathan 
and Shafir 2013; Shah et al. 2015). In deciding about buying a product, alternative consumption 
options come quickly to the top of their mind. Individuals who experience abundance tend to 
pay less attention to opportunity costs because their budgets do not feel as limited. Findings of 
Spiller (2011) suggest that this is not the result of pre-existing differences between the rich and 
the poor. In a lab experiment, participants were more likely to pay attention to opportunity costs 
in performing a shopping task when randomly assigned to weekly (tighter) compared to 
monthly (more extensive) budget frames. Similarly, participants with a smaller budget ($10) 
were more likely to consider opportunity costs when deciding about ordering items from a 
hypothetical breakfast menu than participants with a larger budget ($40). These results suggest 
that scarcity alters people's valuation by directing attention to opportunity costs, implying that 
it is indeed scarcity that drives trade-off thinking and not pre-existing (wealth) differences 
between people. 
Scarcity theory hypothesizes that if the poor are more likely to use trade-offs, it will 
make them less susceptible to irrelevant context features in consumption decisions. Two studies 
support this idea. In a series of experiments, Shah et al. (2015) showed that low-income people 
were less susceptible to irrelevant features in valuing offers, items, and situations.15 Some of 
 
15 This finding not only held under financial scarcity but also under scarcity of time and food. People facing scarcity 
(limited time or a diet) showed fewer inconsistencies in valuing loss of time or fattening in fast-food-frames. 
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these experiments revealed that the poor are less susceptible to relativity bias. Participants were 
asked about their willingness to travel a certain amount of time to another shop for a fixed 
amount of discount ($50) on a particular purchase price ($300, $500, or $1,000). Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of these price conditions. According to standard economic 
theory, the hypothetical question implies a trade-off between the costs (travel a certain amount 
of time) versus the benefits (for a certain amount of discount). The original purchase price 
should be seen as a "supposedly irrelevant factor" (Thaler 2015). In line with previous findings 
of Tversky and Kahneman (1981), higher-income participants were more likely to travel to 
obtain the discount on lower purchase prices, suggesting that they valued the offer in relative 
terms. However, lower-income participants were less sensitive to the proportional size of the 
discount. The poor seem to value the real trade-off of this question better, making them less 
susceptible to the relativity bias. Another study found similar response patterns for citizens of 
low- and middle-income countries as for low-income U.S. residents, although differences in 
wealth within countries seem not to play a role (World Bank 2015). Similarly, Lichand and 
Mani (2020) found that Brazilian farmers were less susceptible to the relativity bias before than 
after payday.16 Overall, trade-off thinking seems to create a more consistent internal valuation 
standard while neglecting irrelevant external effects. 
To what extent are these patterns incentive-compatible and confirmed in the field? To 
our best knowledge, only one field study examined whether people under scarcity are less 
susceptible to inconsistencies in consumption decisions. Fehr et al. (2019) found that facing 
financial scarcity reduces exchange asymmetries (also known as the endowment effect). In a 
large-scale study among Zambian farmers, interviewers gave participants halfway the survey 
randomly one of two similarly-valued items as compensation for their participation. At the end 
 
16 Similarly, farmers were more likely to use proportional thinking after being exposed to little rainfall compared 




of the survey, the interviewers offered them the opportunity to exchange the given item for the 
alternative good. Standard microeconomic theory predicts that half of the people will trade the 
endowed for the offered product, because they received the less preferred item (Kahneman et 
al. 1991).17 However, the authors found strong evidence for the existence of exchange 
asymmetries: A significantly larger share of participants than predicted did not exchange their 
product. Importantly, exploiting ecological variation in financial scarcity around harvest, they 
found that participants were less susceptible to the endowment effect pre-harvest (when farmers 
face relative financial scarcity) than post-harvest (when farmers face relative abundance). This 
finding was robust under other sources of variation in financial scarcity (cross-sectional 
differences in wealth and experimental variation in liquidity constraints). These findings 
suggest that under financial scarcity people tend to pay more attention to the trade-off between 
the endowed and offered good, which subsequently reduces the endowment effect. As a 
consequence, the quality of decision making improves under scarcity.  
However, not all studies support the hypothesis that the poor are less sensitive to 
inconsistencies in decision making. Some experiments conducted by Shah et al. (2015) did not 
reveal differences between higher- and lower-income participants. In one of these experiments, 
they tested whether lower-income individuals are less susceptible to the anchoring effect than 
higher-income individuals. Treatment group participants valued items after being exposed to 
an arbitrary anchor (a random number), while the control group did the same without this 
anchor. Contrary to their expectations, they did not find that lower-income participants were 
less sensitive to the anchoring effect.18 Similarly, they did not find significant differences 
between both income groups for the mental budgeting effect in the lost ticket scenario (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1981). 
 
17 This prediction assumes that half of those who are indifferent between both goods will also exchange. 
18 In line with this finding, Lichand and Mani (2020) did not find differences in sensitivity to the anchoring effect 
before versus after payday. We note that they incorporated the anchoring measure into a cognitive load index 
measure (see Section 5.2). 
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Furthermore, the results of Plantinga et al. (2018) do not support the proposition of 
scarcity theory that poverty induces trade-off thinking. They found equal rates of opportunity 
cost neglect among low-income and high-income people. In a series of high-powered 
experiments, they asked participants whether they would buy a particular product (e.g., a DVD 
or tablet) at a particular price. As a manipulation, some participants were reminded of the 
opportunity costs of this hypothetical purchase while others were not.19 They hypothesized that 
this reminder would have a smaller effect on the willingness to buy the product for lower-
income than for higher-income individuals. If the poor use trade-off thinking in their decision-
making process about the offer, they would naturally think about the opportunity costs. 
However, they did not find evidence that the poor show less opportunity cost neglect than the 
rich. High-income and low-income participants showed an equally strong decrease in 
willingness to buy in response to the reminder. This result was robust under both objective and 
subjective poverty measures and to different types and prices of the offered products. 
Importantly, this result contradicts the finding of Spiller (2011) that people are more likely to 
consider opportunity costs when facing financial constraints.  
We provide two methodological notes to the findings of Plantinga et al. (2018). First, 
the results might have suffered from hypothetical bias. People may apply different decision 
processes in hypothetical purchasing scenarios compared to real-world decision contexts. 
Specifically, we question whether the hypothetical decision context did activate the needs 
threat, which is pivotal in detecting the effects of financial scarcity on outcomes. Otherwise, 
Frederick et al. (2009) found that people behave similarly when purchasing decisions are 
incentivized compared to hypothetical choices. Second, the quasi-experimental design used 
income as the predicting variable, which serves only as a rough proxy of financial scarcity (as 
discussed in Section 2). Third, the quasi-experimental design of their study does not allow 
 
19 This scenario was previously used by Frederick et al. (2009). 
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drawing final conclusions about causality as their scarcity measure was based on existing rather 
than manipulated income levels. Importantly, these methodological notes also apply to the 
studies of Shah et al. (2015) and Mullainathan and Shafir (2013), discussed before. Their study 
designs also involved hypothetical decision scenarios and based their scarcity measure on 
existing income levels.  
Overall, the literature does not provide an unambiguous conclusion regarding the 
proposition of scarcity theory that poverty induces trade-off thinking. Results of most studies 
underpin this proposition showing that low-income people report more trade-off thinking 
(Mullainathan and Shafir 2013; Shah et al. 2015) and value offers and products more 
consistently (Shah et al. 2015) than higher-income individuals. Similarly, Fehr et al. (2019) 
showed that people facing financial scarcity are less susceptible to the endowment effect than 
when they face financial abundance. However, other studies found that high- and low-income 
groups are equally sensitive to opportunity cost neglect (Plantinga et al. 2018) and the anchoring 
and mental budgeting effect (Shah et al. 2015). Methodological issues prevent drawing a final 
conclusion. We recommend future studies to use measures aligning the poverty definition of 
scarcity theory and to design experiments incorporating incentivized consumption choices close 
to real-world contexts.20 Finally, future research should clarify when and to what extent trade-
off thinking guides the decisions of the poor.   
 
5. Poverty, mental bandwidth, and economic decision making 
Mental bandwidth is an umbrella term and could be described as the cognitive ability to perform 
higher-level decisions and behaviors (Schilbach et al. 2016). Mental bandwidth, also referred 
to as cognitive function, includes two components: cognitive capacity and executive control. 
Cognitive capacity, closely related to fluid intelligence, embraces the ability to solve problems 
 
20 The study of Fehr et al. (2019) can serve as a good example of such a field study. 
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and to reason logically. Executive control (also called cognitive control or executive function) 
refers to a set of mental processes that enable people to manage their cognitive activities (Carter 
et al. 1997; Schilbach et al. 2016). Executive control comprises three basic functions: (1) 
working memory operations to keep information retrievable, (2) inhibitory control to override 
impulses and automatic responses, and (3) cognitive flexibility to switch between tasks and 
perspectives (Diamond 2013). Executive control enables people to control their impulses, to 
multitask, to self-monitor, and to focus. So both cognitive capacity and executive control are at 
the core of decision making (Benjamin et al. 2013; Dohmen et al. 2010, 2018). Scarcity theory 
applied to poverty hypothesizes that poverty reduces mental bandwidth (i.e., cognitive capacity 
and executive control), which subsequently increases time discouting and risk aversion. Below 
we will discuss the evidence for these hypotheses (see Table A3 for a literature overview).  
 
5.1 Poverty reduces mental bandwidth: Initial findings 
Scarcity theory hypothesizes that poverty causally impairs cognitive capacity and executive 
function. Initial findings of Mani et al. (2013a) confirm this hypothesis. Their research consists 
of two complementary studies: A lab study among shoppers of a mall in New Jersey (USA) and 
a field study involving Indian farmers. Their lab experiment aimed at examining the impact of 
facing financial challenges. Participants were allocated either large (e.g., an immediate $1,500 
car repair) or small financial challenges (same but $150) and were asked to think about solutions 
to finance it. While thinking about these scenarios, participants had to perform two 
psychological tests measuring fluid intelligence (IQ) and inhibitory control.21 While facing the 
hard financial challenge, low-income participants scored significantly worse on both tasks 
compared to higher-income people, while no differences were found while facing the small 
 
21 Fluid intelligence was measured using Raven’s Matrices test, in which participants had to choose which shape 
was missing from a sequence of shapes. Inhibitory control was measured using a spatial incompatibility task. 
Participants had to alternate between congruent and incongruent actions. For some stimuli, they had to press a 
button on the same side of the screen. For other stimuli, they had to press a button on the opposite side. 
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financial challenge. The magnitude of the effect on fluid intelligence (cognitive capacity) was 
remarkably high, comparable to a difference of 13–14 IQ points. The decrease in correct presses 
in the inhibitory control task was 20 percent points on average in case of the “hard” financial 
challenge as compared with the easy financial challenge.  
The proposed mechanism is that the hard financial challenge triggers thoughts of 
scarcity by low-income participants, bringing monetary issues to the top of mind, and 
temporarily leaving less mental bandwidth for other tasks. Richer people, who have more space 
in their budgets to solve the immediate car bill problem directly, are not required to put much 
cognitive effort to the challenge. Some additional experiments ruled out the possibility of 
anxiety for large numbers, (no) payment for correct test responses, and the impact of the 
cognitive tests themselves as alternative explanations. The effects were equally large in the 
replication studies. Overall, these results suggest that poverty-related monetary concerns 
directly and temporarily impair cognitive function.  
The field study tried to deal with external validity by examining the relationship between 
poverty and cognitive function in a natural setting. The income of Indian sugarcane farmers 
largely depends on the revenues of the harvest. Consequently, they face more monetary 
concerns before than after harvest, as evidenced by substantially higher loan rates and higher 
rates of reported trouble with paying ordinary bills. The farmers were interviewed twice: before 
and after harvest. Both interviews incorporated a fluid intelligence test and an inhibitory control 
task.22 Before harvest, the same farmers performed significant worse on the cognitive control 
task than after harvest. More specifically, they made 15 percent more errors and were 11 percent 
slower in responding. Furthermore, participants scored significantly lower on the fluid 
intelligence test, corresponding with a decline of 9–10 IQ points. Although their research design 
 
22 Cognitive capacity was measured using Raven’s Matrices test (same as in the shopping mall study). Inhibitory 
control was measured using a numerical Stroop task which is appropriate to test low-literacy participants. To 
perform well on the test, participants had to neglect their automatic response. When they see 4 4 4 on the screen, 
they had to respond with the number of digits (3) instead of the digit 4 (the intuitive response). 
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could not inherently rule out potential confounds, the authors argue that the results cannot be 
fully explained by factors like learning effects, stress, or physical exertion. They conclude that 
poverty itself impedes cognitive function. So scarcity of financial resources results in monetary 
challenges that require mental bandwidth to address, leaving less available bandwidth for other 
activities.  
How does financial scarcity impair cognitive function? Scarcity theory proposes that 
cognitive load underlies the impact of poverty on cognitive capacity and executive control 
(Gennetian and Shafir 2015; Mani et al. 2013a; Mullainathan and Shafir 2013; Schilbach et al. 
2016). Mental bandwidth can be taxed when the mind of people has to deal with too many 
demands and disruptions. Cognitive load tends to affect both aspects of mental bandwidth in a 
negative way (see Gennetian and Shafir (2015) for an overview in light of scarcity theory). 
Poverty can produce cognitive load via both internal and external sources. Scarcity theory 
follows the internal cognitive load mechanism.23 Living in poverty means that one has to deal 
with many monetary and non-monetary concerns attracting attention, like managing income 
volatility and payment deadlines, juggling expenses, and making difficult trade-offs in 
consumption. Additionally, low-income individuals dwell more upon their financial problems 
(Johar et al. 2015) and worry more about their financial future (de Bruijn and Antonides 2020). 
These preoccupations consume cognitive resources leaving less bandwidth for other activities.  
While the results were striking, the studies of Mani et al. (2013a) have some important 
methodological limitations. First, the harvest study uses a simple pre-post research design as an 
identification strategy, thus lacking a control group. As a consequence, this study cannot fully 
rule out time trends or potential learning effects (Kremer et al. 2019; Wicherts and Zand 
 
23 Scarcity theory focuses on the financial and material dimensions of poverty, more specifically on the effects of 
feelings of having less than one needs. This neglects the social context (social class, stigmatization), physiological 
issues (lack of nutrition) and physical obstacles (lack of sleep) that surround individuals living in poverty. These 
may create additional taxes on people’s mental bandwidth. Beyond the scope of scarcity theory, poverty may also 
induce cognitive load via these external stimuli. Recent studies have begun to unravel how poverty impairs 
cognitive function and economic performance via a lack of sleep (Bessone et al. 2020) and background noise (J. 
T. Dean 2020). See E. B. Dean et al. (2019) for a literature overview and a discussion of other mechanisms.  
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Scholten 2013). Additionally, the used cognitive control task in the shopping mall study seems 
to be inappropriate due to ceiling effects caused by the simplicity of the task (Wicherts and 
Zand Scholten 2013). The used task did not discriminate well among individuals with higher 
cognitive control levels, specifically among higher-income individuals. As a consequence, 
Wicherts and Zand Scholten (2013) suggest that financial worries might also impair cognitive 
control of higher-income individuals.24  
 
5.2 Poverty reduces mental bandwidth: Findings from replication studies 
Since the initial findings of Mani et al. (2013a) were published, several studies have tried to 
replicate these results. These replication studies examining the impact of poverty on mental 
bandwidth show mixed results. Two studies examined the effect of poverty on cognitive 
capacity (fluid intelligence). First, as part of a study examining the impact of financial worries 
on risk-aversion, Dalton et al. (2020) also investigated the effect on fluid intelligence. To this 
end, they conducted a lab-in-the-field experiment among low-income small retailers in 
Vietnam. To induce financial worries, they used a similar method as Mani et al. (2013a) in 
which participants were randomly assigned to scenarios either involving large ("hard") or small 
("easy") negative financial shocks. Contrary to the findings of Mani et al. (2013a), they did not 
find an effect of financial worries on fluid intelligence. Second, in their study among Zambian 
farmers, Fehr et al. (2019) also investigated the effects of financial scarcity on fluid intelligence. 
They found an inconsistent relationship between scarcity and fluid intelligence. Using cross-
sectional differences in wealth, they found that lower wealth was associated with lower fluid 
intelligence. However, this finding did not replicate under seasonal (pre- vs. post-harvest) and 
 
24 Furthermore, Wicherts & Zand Scholten (2013) argued that the median split income procedure, applied by Mani 
et al. (2013a) to analyze the shopping mall experiment, was unnecessary and inappropriate. They reanalyzed the 
data without dichotomization of income for each of the three core experiments and found insignificant interaction 
effects (financial scenarios vs. income) on fluid intelligence. However, Mani et al. (2013b) responded that using 
binary income variables is standard when income data is noisy. Furthermore, they found a significant interaction 
effect on fluid intelligence when analyzing the data of the three core experiments together. Overall, we consider 
the effect on fluid intelligence as robust. 
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experimental (disbursement of a consumption loan) variation in financial scarcity.25 Fluid 
intelligence scores did not significantly differ between pre-harvest compared to post-harvest 
conditions and before vs. after paying back a consumption loan. As a methodological limitation, 
we note that both the cross-sectional and pre-post (harvest) elements of the study might have 
failed to control for all potential confounders, while the experimental manipulation might not 
have been strong enough to evoke different levels in feelings of financial scarcity.  
Four studies have investigated the effect of poverty on cognitive control, showing mixed 
results. Two of these studies did not reveal this effect. In their study among Zambian farmers, 
Fehr et al. (2019) found a similar inconsistent effect on cognitive control as for fluid 
intelligence. Although lower wealth was associated with lower levels of cognitive control, this 
result did not carry over to seasonal and experimental variation in financial scarcity. In another 
study, Carvalho, Wang, & Meier (2016) exploited natural variations in financial resources of 
U.S. low-income households around payday to examine the causal effect of financial 
circumstances on cognitive function. Households were randomly assigned to a before-payday 
or an after-payday survey. Baseline data of both studies show that households face tougher 
financial circumstances before payday compared to after payday (e.g., lower expenditures, cash 
holdings, and checking and savings account balances). However, results did not support the 
hypothesis of greater scarcity before payday impeding executive function.26 This holds both for 
the full sample as for more financially constrained subgroups. They conclude that short-term 
variations in financial circumstances did not diminish cognitive function.  
However, the results of the latter study are subject to debate due to some methodological 
issues. First, variation in financial scarcity around payday might not be extreme enough for 
identifying the effects on cognitive function. As noted by Mani et al. (2013a), participants 
 
25 Overall, results of this study did confirm the trade-off thinking but not the mental bandwidth tax hypothesis of 
scarcity theory. 
26 The cognitive function tests included the Cognitive reflection test (System 1 vs. System 2 thinking), the Flanker 
task (inhibitory control task), the working memory task, and the Numerical Stroop Task (cognitive control).  
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received up to four payments within a study month, of which one payment was chosen as the 
payday shock. Thus, around payday, participants faced only a small temporary shock in 
financial resources, especially when compared with participants in the harvest study of Mani et 
al. (2013a). Second, the payday research design might not have captured well the financial 
shocks around payday. Reanalyzing the data, Mani et al. (2020) show that insufficient control 
of the time of survey completion (before vs. after payday) seems to explain the non-results.  
Additionally, they found that executive control declined consistently as participants approached 
payday suggesting that facing financial scarcity causes cycles in executive control. We note 
that causal evidence is needed to fully rule out selection effects for this finding. 
The results of two other studies confirmed the hypothesis that poverty impairs cognitive 
control. Ong et al. (2019) investigated the impact of a debt relief program (worth about three 
months of income) on cognitive functioning. They found that low-income Singaporean 
participants performed significantly better on a cognitive control task (Flanker task) after debt 
relief than before. Because this study used a pre-post design to identify treatment effects, similar 
to the harvest study of Mani et al. (2013a), learning effects and potential confounders might 
have affected the results.  In their field study among Brazilian farmers, Lichand and Mani 
(2020) also investigated the impact of variations in rainfall (uncertainty) and payday (liquidity) 
on executive function. Farmers exposed to less rainfall worried more about rainfall and 
performed worse on cognitive control than farmers exposed to more rainfall.27 This drop in 
cognitive performance was equivalent to the gap between higher and lower educated farmers 
and was largest for low-income farmers. Furthermore, experimental induction of drought-
related worries provided similar results. However, variation in payday did not affect executive 
function, except for farmers in the poorest regions.  These results suggest that the minds of 
 
27 More specifically, this study measured the effects on cognitive load using an index including scores on executive 
function (measured using an attention and inhibitory control task , and a working memory task) and an anchoring 
scenario. This latter measure deviates from others because it incorporates decisions that might be affected by 
cognitive load.    
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farmers facing less rainfall were loaded with thoughts about droughts and related financial 
uncertainty leaving less bandwidth for other activities. Additionally, the results suggest that 
income uncertainty (facing a lack of rainfall) dominates temporary liquidity constraints (around 
payday) as the main driver of the mental bandwidth tax caused by poverty. 
Overall, the literature does not provide unambiguous evidence for the hypothesis that 
poverty reduces mental bandwidth.28 The above studies show some general results. First, the 
effect of poverty on fluid intelligence (cognitive capacity), initially found by Mani et al. 
(2013a), did not hold in replication studies (Dalton et al. 2020; Fehr et al. 2019). Second, studies 
that have investigated the impact of poverty on cognitive control show mixed results. 
Specifically, the effect was not found in studies exploiting (monthly) payday (Carvalho et al. 
2016; Lichand and Mani 2020) or loan disbursement (Fehr et al. 2019), possibly because these 
financial shocks are too small to affect cognitive control meaningfully. Furthermore, these 
payday research designs did not capture financial uncertainty, which might primarily drive the 
adverse effect of poverty on cognitive control (Lichand and Mani 2020). As far as we know, no 
study attempted to fully replicate the findings of the shopping mall study of Mani et al. 
(2013a).29 We highly recommend a direct replication of this lab-in-the-field experiment in 
different economic environments (low-, middle-, and high-income countries) to gain insight 
into the robustness and external validity of these core findings. 
 
28 Some  studies have found that particular cognitive functions even improve under scarcity. Dang et al. (2016) 
found that lower-income participants performed better than their more affluent counterparts on an information-
integration categorization task after being induced with financial concerns. These findings suggest that poverty-
induced thoughts improve procedural-based cognitive functions. Additionally, Zhao and Tomm (2017) showed 
that scarcity-induced focus facilitates memory-encoding of task-relevant information (see Section 3.1). 
29 As far as we know, no study attempted to fully replicate the effects on both fluid intelligence and cognitive 
control in a similar experimental setting. As discussed, Dalton et al. (2020) tried to replicate the effect of poverty 
on fluid intelligence using similar scenarios as Mani et al. (2013a). Because the literature might suffer from a 
publication bias, we searched for unpublished direct replications among Google references to the original paper of 
Mani et al. (2013a), last in December, 2020. Using the search term "replicate," we found 279 hits. Among these 
hits, we found three Master theses that attempted to directly replicate the effect of poverty on fluid intelligence. 
First, Graves (2015) did not find a significant effect of poverty on fluid intelligence. However, this replication was 
underpowered as noticed by the author. Second, Joy (2017) found a significant effect on fluid intelligence similarly 
to that of Mani et al. (2013a). Third, Plantinga (2014) did not find a significant effect of scarcity on both cognitive 
control and fluid intelligence in an online experiment.  
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Investigating the impact of poverty on mental bandwidth comes with methodological 
challenges, as we illustrated for each discussed study. We will shortly discuss these challenges 
and provide some directions to improve study designs. First, identification of treatment effects 
in real-world settings is challenging. Specifically, it is hard to isolate the effect of financial 
scarcity from that of other environmental and poverty-related causes. In designing field studies, 
researchers should consider the size and timing of the financial shock (Mani et al. 2020). The 
before-after differences in income or wealth due to the financial shock must be large enough 
and should be distinguishable from other shocks in income or expenditure. Additionally, 
researchers should consider whether the financial shock incorporates only shocks in levels of 
income, wealth, or liquidity, or also variation in financial uncertainty. Furthermore, alternative 
mechanisms (e.g., stress or motivational factors) might drive the (non-)results and must thus be 
accounted for. Finally, researchers should a-priori seek ways to control for confounding 
variables. As is the case for all natural and field experimental studies, the quality of the control 
group strongly determines the quality of the results. Cash-transfer and basic income 
experiments might provide good opportunities to further examine the effect of poverty on 
mental bandwidth.  
Second, measuring (effects on) cognitive function in field settings using psychological 
tasks is challenging. Performance on these tasks can be affected by pre-existing differences 
between experimental groups, learning effects, interview-related load, and floor and ceiling 
effects. In field settings, it is hard to fully control for these potential artifacts possibly leading 
to spurious effects. To solve this issue, we recommend to specify the cognitive mechanism 
under investigation a-priori and design the experimental study accordingly. Just adding a 
particular task or test (somewhere in the experimental procedure) to control for cognitive 
function as a potential explanation is not enough. Both lab and field studies should clarify that 
their study design captures the temporary effect of facing financial scarcity on mental 
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bandwidth. Additionally, besides selecting a suitable control group, careful task selection and 
extensive piloting of the full test and interview procedure in the target population will help to 
minimize measurement problems (see Schilbach et al., 2016, and Dean et al., 2019, for 
overviews of suitable measures in field settings). Specifically, more attention is required for 
using the Raven test as measurement instrument for fluid intelligence. All studies that measured 
the effect of poverty on fluid intelligence used a small subset of Raven matrices. However, it is 
unknown whether this abbreviated version did affect its reliability and validity.30 As the use of 
abbreviated Raven tests becomes increasingly popular in economic studies, we recommend the 
development of a standardized protocol. This protocol should shed light on selecting an 
appropriate number of matrices, whether or not including the progressive component of the 
original Raven test, and how the number of matrices affects the reliability and validity of the 
measure. 
 
5.3 Effects on economic decision making 
Time discounting and risk aversion are central elements of a broad range of economic decisions 
and behaviors. Several studies have shown that poverty increases both time discounting and 
risk aversion (see for an overview: Haushofer and Fehr 2014), while stress and negative affect 
(Haushofer and Fehr 2014) and rational responses to liquidity constraints (Carvalho et al. 2016) 
act as main underlying mechanisms. Scarcity theory hypothesizes that financial scarcity 
increases temporal discounting and risk aversion via cognitive load (Schilbach et al. 2016).31 
We review the evidence for this hypothesis in two parts. First, we discuss evidence for the effect 
of cognitive load on both temporal discounting and risk aversion. We then review studies that 
 
30 An abbreviated Raven test might perform almost equally well as the full version (see e.g., Bilker et al. [2012]). 
However, it is unknown whether this is also the case for the versions used by Mani et al. (2013a), Dalton et al. 
(2020), and Fehr et al. (2019). 
31 This hypothesis was proposed by Schilbach et al. (2016) in their literature overview. We note that Mullainathan 
and Shafir (2013) did not provide specific predictions for these economic outcomes in their book. 
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have investigated the impact of financial scarcity on both outcomes and discuss whether 
cognitive load acts as an underlying mechanism.  
Several studies have examined the impact of cognitive load on economic decision 
making. Some of these studies show how the decision-making process alters due to cognitive 
load. Cognitive load increases the reliance on shortcuts and heuristics in making choices 
(Kahneman 2011; Kahneman and Frederick 2002). According to the dual-processing model, 
cognitive load affects the controlling operations of the deliberative, reflective thinking system 
(System 2) resulting in increased reliance on the intuitive cognitive system (System 1). As a 
consequence, cognitive load potentially contributes to more errors in making decisions. Other 
studies address the question of how decisions change as a result of cognitive load. In their 
overview of empirical research, Deck & Jahedi (2015) show consistent evidence that cognitive 
load increases risk aversion. Evidence of a detrimental impact of cognitive load on temporal 
choices is mixed. While some studies suggest that cognitive load makes people more impatient, 
others do not support this hypothesis. Additional experiments conducted by Deck & Jahedi 
(2015) confirmed the above results and showed that cognitive load increased both risk-aversion 
and money-related impatience.  
Recently, researchers have begun to investigate the effect of poverty on economic 
decision making via the scarcity mechanism. Studies consistently show that facing financial 
scarcity increases temporal discounting (Bartos et al. 2018; Carvalho et al. 2016; Cassidy 2018; 
Ong et al. 2019). In a lab-in-the-field experiment among low-income Ugandan farmers, Bartos 
et al. (2018) investigated the effect of feelings of poverty on time discounting. Similar to the 
manipulation used by Mani et al. (2013a), these farmers were asked to think about the 
consequences of a scenario involving either a minor or a severe negative financial shock. 
Thereafter, they had to make a consequential decision about timing of consuming entertainment 
early and delaying work effort. The results show that poverty-induced thoughts increased the 
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farmers' preference for consuming entertainment earlier and delaying work effort, reflecting 
increased time discounting. The authors suggest that poverty-related thoughts directly reduce 
the ability to exercise self-control, possibly via cognitive load. As cognitive load was not 
directly measured, the exact mechanism still remains unclear.32 In their study among 
Singaporean low-income households, Ong et al. (2019) showed that debt relief reduced present 
bias. However, they found only weak descriptive evidence of a mediating role of cognitive 
control underlying this effect. Other studies exploiting variation in payday (Carvalho et al. 
2016) and windfalls (Cassidy 2018) found that poverty increased time discounting, but not due 
to cognitive load. Both studies propose that increased time discounting might reflect rational 
adaptations of the poor to changes in liquidity constraints rather than increased cognitive load. 
The literature shows mixed evidence for the hypothesis that financial scarcity increases 
risk aversion, while evidence of cognitive load as an underlying mechanism is almost absent. 
In their study among Vietnamese retailers, Dalton et al. (2020) found that induced financial 
worries resulted in less risk-averse behavior. Furthermore, induced financial worries increased 
perceived stress, but not fluid intelligence (as discussed in Section 5.2). These results contradict 
both the hypothesis that financial scarcity increases risk-aversion and findings that cognitive 
load increases risk aversion (Deck and Jahedi 2015). The authors propose that acute stress rather 
than cognitive load function as underlying mechanism. In their payday study, Carvalho et al. 
(2016) did not find an effect of financial scarcity on risk behavior. Only a study of Ong et al. 
(2019) found that debt relief reduced risk aversion. Similar as for the effect on time-discounting, 
suggestive evidence for a mediating role of cognitive control was weak. 
 
32 The authors investigated whether attentional distraction underlies the effect on temporal discounting. However, 
they did not find differences between experimental conditions in decision-making time, distraction while making 
the decision, and patterns of information acquisition. In sum, these results do not support the view that poverty 
reduces attention. We note that this study does not provide a formal test of the attentional mechanism of scarcity 
theory as discussed in Section 3. The study tested whether poverty-induced thoughts reduced attention during the 
decision-making process, rather than changed attentional allocation.  
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Overall, the literature provides consistent evidence that financial scarcity increases 
temporal discounting, although evidence for cognitive load as underlying mechanism is weak. 
The literature does not provide consistent evidence that financial scarcity increases risk 
aversion, while evidence for cognitive load as the underlying pattern is almost absent. These 
findings raise two issues. First, it is unclear how financial scarcity affects risk aversion as 
studies have shown positive (Ong et al. 2019), negative (Dalton et al. 2020), or no effects 
(Carvalho et al. 2016). A potential explanation is that risk behavior under financial scarcity 
might depend on whether the prospect involves a potential loss or gain (Adamkovič and 
Martončik 2017). Under poverty, people may have the tendency to take less risk for a potential 
financial gain (see e.g., Guiso and Paiella 2008) and to risk more to avoid a potential loss 
(Dalton et al. 2020). Thus, financial scarcity might strengthen loss aversion, which refers to 
people's tendency to prefer avoiding losses over acquiring equivalent gains (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979). Indeed, lower income is associated with increased loss aversion (Vieider et al. 
2019). Second, we question whether the effect of poverty on economic decision making 
operates via cognitive load. While our literature review shows consistent evidence that poverty 
increases time discounting, evidence for an effect of cognitive load on this outcome is mixed 
(Deck and Jahedi 2015). Similarly, the cognitive load literature confirms that cognitive load 
increases risk aversion (Deck and Jahedi 2015), but evidence for the hypothesis that financial 
scarcity increases risk aversion is mixed at best.  
We note that financial scarcity can affect other economic outcomes via cognitive load. 
In a recent study among Indian workers, Kaur et al. (2019) randomized the timing of income 
payment while equalizing overall earnings. Workers receiving an earlier payment increased 
their productivity by 5.3 percent in comparison with workers who received their payments later. 
This increase in productivity almost doubled for poorer workers. Additionally, early payment 
reduced attentional errors suggesting that facing lower financial strain improves cognition and 
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subsequently productivity. Future studies should examine what exactly happens when people 




Our work aimed to review scarcity theory applied to the context of poverty. To this end, we 
reviewed the evidence for three fundamental hypotheses of this theory. Below, we will shortly 
summarize the status of the evidence for each hypothesis, discuss the overall status of scarcity 
theory applied to poverty, and provide some general directions for future research. 
Scarcity theory applied to poverty hypothesizes that poverty affects economic decisions 
and behaviors via three mechanisms (see Figure 1). We briefly state the status of the evidence 
for each relationship. As we showed in Section 3, lab studies provide consistent evidence that 
scarcity leads to a greater focus on scarcity-related demands, enhances resource efficiency, 
facilitates memory-encoding, and causes overborrowing. Evidence that scarcity leads to 
attentional neglect is weaker. It is still unclear whether overborrowing results from attentional 
focus and neglect. Additionally, evidence for the ecological validity of the attentional focus 
mechanism is weak as field studies examining this mechanism in real-world contexts are scarce. 
As discussed in Section 4, most studies confirmed that poverty induces trade-off thinking and 
subsequently results in more consistent consumption decisions. However, methodological 
issues and some inconsistent findings prevent a final conclusion. As reported in Section 5, the 
literature provides mixed evidence for the hypothesis that poverty impairs cognitive capacity 
and executive control. Additionally, the literature consistently shows that financial scarcity 
increases time discounting, while evidence for a positive effect on risk aversion is mixed. 
However, the current literature does not support the view that cognitive load underlies the effect 
of financial scarcity on temporal discounting and risk aversion. 
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This overview brings us to a remaining question: How should we evaluate the overall 
status of scarcity theory? Following the definition of Kerlinger and Lee (2000), "a theory is a 
set of interrelated constructs, definitions, and propositions that present a systematic view of 
phenomena by specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of explaining and 
predicting the phenomena" (p. 11). We apply the properties of a useful theory proposed by 
Dennis and Kintch (2007) to evaluate the status of scarcity theory applied to poverty. Building 
upon reasonable claims that cognitive resources are limited, scarcity theory applied to poverty 
provides an original, coherent, and parsimonious explanation that a single phenomenon 
(financial scarcity) explains a variety of behavioral phenomena (economic decisions and 
behaviors) operating via two core psychological mechanisms (tunneling and cognitive load). 
Furthermore, these mechanisms do not only operate under poverty but also under several other 
forms of scarcity (e.g., drink, food, and time scarcity). Importantly, the theory provides testable 
and falsifiable hypotheses. However, the theory lacks precision in defining key mechanisms (as 
researchers use different names, definitions, and operationalizations for the attentional and 
cognitive load mechanism) and predicting economic outcomes (which are rather empirically 
driven than theory-based). Furthermore, we showed that the theory does not fully accord with 
the available data. More specifically, while the literature provides (mainly) consistent evidence 
for the attentional focus and neglect mechanism and related borrowing and consumption 
behaviors, evidence for the cognitive load mechanism and associated behaviors is mixed at best. 
As the strength of a theory relies on the evidence, the current evidence limits the strength of 
scarcity theory. 
We recommend two general lines for future research additional to the specific 
recommendations in Section 2–5. First, more theoretical work is needed. Currently, scarcity 
theory is stated verbally. We recommend researchers to translate the theory into formal models 
(e.g., mathematical or computational models) to enforce precision in defining constructs and 
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mechanisms and to predict economic outcomes. Second, future work should focus on improving 
our understanding of the mechanisms enforced by facing financial scarcity. Brain research 
might help to detect which brain activities underly the effect of facing scarcity on downstream 
behaviors. In an initial study, Huijsmans et al. (2019) found that a scarcity mindset is associated 
with increased activity in the orbitofrontal cortex (which encodes valuation processes) and 
decreased activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (which is known for its involvement in 
the executive functions). Additionally, we need to know whether other mechanisms are at play, 
besides tunneling and cognitive load, and how these mechanisms compete with each other. At 
least stress and negative affect seem to play a role (Haushofer and Fehr 2014) but it is unclear 
to what extent these mediators coincide with each other. Finally, future studies should deepen 
our understanding of when facing scarcity improves and when it impairs performance. Scarcity 
theory predicts that facing scarcity makes people both less (via trade-off thinking) and more 
(via attentional neglect and cognitive load) susceptible to biases in decision making. However, 
it is not fully clear how scarcity triggers either mechanism. For example, the shopping task 
(Spiller 2011) and the Angry Blueberries (Shah et al. 2012) experiment contained similar 
intertemporal choice contexts but predicted and found different results. We suggest that choice 
architecture might also play a role. Future studies should address this issue.   
In conclusion, we have reviewed the evidence for the key propositions of scarcity theory 
applied to poverty and evaluated the overall status of this theory. Although scarcity theory 
coherently and parsimoniously explains how financial scarcity affects economic decisions and 
behaviors, the theory does not fully accord with the available data. In general, both building 
models and testing implications contribute to a virtuous cycle of theory development (Smaldino 
2019). While building formal models will help to enforce precision, rigorous testing will help 
to unravel empirical patterns. We recommend increased efforts on both elements of the theory 
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development cycle. Finally, these efforts will contribute to a stronger theory explaining how 
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Table A1: Literature overview of the impact of poverty on attention and economic  
behavior 
Notes. We only incorporate studies with a clear link to poverty and economic decision making. See Cannon et al. 
(2019) for a complete literature overview of mechanisms and behaviors induced by resource scarcity. "(Not) 
confirmed" indicates whether the results of the study did (not) confirm the hypothesis that poverty/scarcity leads 
to greater focus, attentional neglect, and overborrowing. 
Reference Type of study Scarcity induction method 
/ identification strategy 
Result 
Shah et al. 
(2012) 
Lab experiments 
N = 56–143 per 
study 
Games: Angry Blueberries 
and Family Feud 
Small and large budgets of 
shots and time 
Scarcity leads to greater focus, 
attentional neglect, and overborrowing. 
"Confirmed" 





N = ± 1,000 per 
study 
Self–replication of 
Shah et al. (2012) 
Idem Scarcity leads to greater focus and 
overborrowing. Effects on attentional 
neglect were weaker/not robust. 
"Mainly confirmed" 





Lab experiments Place a meal order from a 
hypothetical menu:  Large 
and small price/calorie 
budgets 
 
Solve a series of digital 
puzzles:  Large and small 
time budgets 
Scarcity of money, calories, and time 
caused a greater focus on scarcity-related 
information, while inducing neglect of 












Identification strategies:  
(1) income uncertainty: (a) 
natural variation in rainfall 
and (b) experimental 
induction of drought-related 
worries 
(2) income level: variation 
in payday  
 
Outcome: tunneling 
Farmers facing lower rainfall 
rates/induced with drought-related 
worries were more likely to tunnel than 
farmers facing higher rainfall rates/in the 
control condition. Furthermore, farmers 
before payday were more likely to tunnel 




Table A2: Literature overview of the impact of poverty on trade-off thinking and 
economic decision making 
Notes. "(Not) confirmed" indicates whether the results of the study did (not) confirm the hypothesis that 
poverty/scarcity increases trade-off thinking. 
 
Reference Type of study Scarcity induction method / 
identification strategy 
Result 
Spiller (2011) Lab experiments 
 
Daily shopping task:  Budget 
frames ( weekly vs. monthly) 
Breakfast menu scenario: small 
vs. larger budget in the wallet 
Participants under (perceived) 
resource scarcity are more 
likely to consider or report 
opportunity costs than 








Poverty measure: Income 
 
Scenarios:  
USA-study: Buying a TV 
India-study: Buying a blender 
and a TV  
Low-income participants 
were more likely to report  
trade-off thinking for buying 
a TV (USA) and a blender 
(India)  than higher-income 
participants. In India-study, 
no differences found for 
buying a relatively expensive 
product (TV).   
"Confirmed" 




Poverty measure: Income 
 
Beer-on-the-beach scenario: 
considerations for the purchase  
 
Lower-income participants 
were more likely to name 
trade-offs as main 
consideration. 
"Confirmed" 





Poverty measure: Income 
 
Scenarios: Beer-on-the-beach, 
proportional thinking, dominance 
lottery, accessible accounts 
Lower-income participants 
more consistent in valuation 
of products and less 
susceptible to context effects. 
"Confirmed" 
Shah et al. (2015) 




Poverty measure: Income 
 
Scenarios: Mental budgeting, 
anchoring 
No significant differences 
between higher- and lower-
income participants found for 
the anchoring and mental 
budgeting effects. 
"Not confirmed" 





Poverty measures: Income, 
subjective wealth, and subjective 
social status 
 
Scenario: willingness to pay for 
attractive products (manipulation: 
reminded of opportunity costs) 
Rich and poor participants 
showed an equally strong 
decline in willingness to pay 
when reminded of 
opportunity costs. Finding 
robust for all poverty 
measures. 
"Not confirmed" 




Identification strategies: (1) 
Cross-sectional variation in 
wealth, (2) natural variation in 
wealth due to harvest, and (3) 
random variation in loan 
disbursement 
 
Exchange asymmetry: Propensity 
to trade a randomly endowed 
item for an alternative at a later 
moment 
Across all sources of 
variation, greater financial 
scarcity was associated with 
smaller exchange 
asymmetries (i.e., participants 





Table A3: Literature overview of the impact of poverty on cognitive capacity and 
executive control 
Notes. "(Not) confirmed" indicates whether the results of the study did (not) confirm the hypothesis that 
poverty/scarcity impairs cognitive capacity/executive control.  
 





















Study 1: Income vs. 
scenario's: thinking 
about hard vs. easy 
financial challenge 
Study 2: Shock in 
income of Indian 
sugarcane farmers 
(pre- vs. post-harvest) 




Study 1: poverty-related thoughts 
impair fluid intelligence and 
cognitive control of lower-
income, but not of higher-income 
participants. 
Study 2: Participants scored 
significantly better on fluid 
intelligence and cognitive control 










Financial shock for 
low-income US-
households: Before 







Participants surveyed before and 
after payday performed similar on 
cognitive function tasks  
"Not confirmed" 














Participants showed improved 
cognitive control and reduced 
negative affect, risk-aversion, and 
present bias after debt relief.  
"Confirmed" 
Dalton et 








Induction of financial 





Being exposed to financial 
worries did not affect fluid 
intelligence. Entrepreneurs 
exposed to financial worries 
behaved less risk-averse than 
those in the control condition. 
"Not confirmed" 










sectional variation in 
wealth, (2) natural 
variation in wealth 
around harvest, and 
(3) random variation 





Inconsistent relationship between 
financial scarcity and cognitive 
function. Cross-sectional: 
Wealthier participants score 
better than poorer participants. 
No clear pattern for other sources 



















natural variation in 




(2) Income level: 







Farmers exposed to less 
rainfall/drought-related worries 
performed worse on executive 
function tasks than farmers 
exposed to more rainfall/control 
condition. Variation in payday 
(before vs. after) did not affect 
executive function (except for the 
poorest).  
"Confirmed" 
